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PRIVATE POLICING OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE: DOES IT FURTHER 
PUBLIC GOALS? 
Sarah L. Stafford* 
Abstract: Over the past two decades the role of private parties in the polic-
ing of environmental regulation has grown dramatically. In some cases the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has led this effort. In other situa-
tions, private parties have provided the impetus for new policing activities 
that are conducted independently from the EPA. Private policing can be 
beneficial when the increased involvement of the private sector either de-
creases the costs of achieving a particular level of environmental perform-
ance or increases environmental performance in a cost-effective manner. 
Private parties, however, could also divert regulated entities away from 
regulatory objectives. This Article explores the privatization of environ-
mental enforcement by presenting six examples and highlighting their 
benefits and costs. Although the examples cited are not necessarily repre-
sentative of all private policing, their mixed results regarding the effec-
tiveness of private sector participation shows a need for careful evaluation 
of these initiatives. The Article concludes by making a case for a more de-
liberate approach to evaluating the role of the private sector in the en-
forcement of environmental regulation, and suggests that before respond-
ing to continuing calls to further privatize environmental regulation and 
enforcement it is first necessary to ensure that existing private participa-
tion is helping to achieve regulatory goals. 
Introduction 
 Environmental regulation is often seen as an adversarial system 
that pits regulated entities against a public regulatory agency. In this 
simplistic view, legal requirements and an aggressive enforcement re-
gime are necessary to ensure that regulated entities conduct themselves 
in ways they would not in an unregulated situation. This conception 
does not provide an active role for unregulated private parties—such 
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parties are envisaged only as passive beneficiaries of the increased envi-
ronmental quality resulting from the regulation, or as victims of the 
increased costs imposed by the regulation. In reality, the relationship 
between regulated entities, the regulatory agency, and unregulated pri-
vate parties—often quite active in environmental enforcement—is 
much more complex. Overall, both regulated and unregulated private 
parties play a central role in the implementation and enforcement of 
environmental regulation. During the past two decades this role has 
expanded significantly.1 In some cases, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has led both formal and informal efforts to involve pri-
vate parties. In other situations, private parties have provided the impe-
tus for a new, larger role in the enforcement of environmental regula-
tions that is, for the most part, independent of the EPA. 
 One of the primary motivations for the EPA to involve private par-
ties in environmental enforcement has been a steadily declining level of 
enforcement resources.2 Between 1994 and 2010, the EPA’s enforce-
ment budget fell from over $630 million to less than $560 million in 
real dollars, and staffing at the EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Com-
pliance Assistance (OECA) fell from around 4200 full-time equivalent 
employees to 3400.3 Budget pressures, however, are not the only reason 
the private sector has taken a more prominent role in environmental 
enforcement and compliance.4 The EPA has also looked to the private 
sector to increase compliance among facilities where traditional en-
forcement tools have not been successful.5 Additionally, the private sec-
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Marc Allen Eisner, Governing the Environment: The Transformation of 
Environmental Regulation 93–95 (2007). One might loosely tie the increasing in-
volvement of the private sector to the Clinton-Gore Administration, which embraced the 
idea of reinventing government. See id. at 94 (noting that delegating more authority to 
regulated entities became a central tenet of the “Reinventing Government” movement of 
the Clinton administration). 
2 See id. at 115–16 (noting a lack of experienced leaders in environmental enforcement 
during the Bush administration, as well as dramatic reductions in the enforcement budg-
et). In addition to declining resources, the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assis-
tance (OECA) was often without a strong leader. See id. 
3 See Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and 
Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 5 Rev. of Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 3, 7 fig. 1 
(2011). The budget data includes only federal expenditures. Id. 
4 See, e.g., Eisner, supra note 1, at 133–51 (describing reasons for corporations to vol-
untarily manage pollution). 
5 See, e.g., Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA & Chem. Mfrs. 
Ass’n, EPA-305-R99-001, Root Cause Analysis Pilot Project: An Industry Survey 3 
(1999). For example, the Root Cause Analysis Project was an analysis conducted jointly by 
the EPA and the Chemical Manufacturer’s Association from 1996 to 1998. Id. The project 
surveyed about two dozen chemical facilities that violated environmental regulations to 
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tor can be more innovative than the EPA, in part because private enti-
ties can take a holistic approach to environmental performance.6 The 
EPA has difficulty adopting this approach because environmental laws, 
and thus the EPA’s regulatory programs, address environmental media 
such as water, air, and hazardous waste separately.7 
  Support for privatization is generally based on the belief that the 
market can provide some public activities or services either at lower 
cost, or it can provide a more beneficial alternative at the same cost as 
the publicly provided alternative.8 Conversely, if an activity can be con-
ducted more cheaply by the government than by the private sector, or if 
the government can provide a higher quality good or service than the 
private sector, there is no justification for privatization.9 With respect to 
the implementation and enforcement of environmental regulation, 
private parties may be able to do some things more cost effectively than 
the EPA.10 In particular, private organizations often have better access 
to certain information, and can generally make decisions more quickly 
and with less red tape than public agencies.11 
 Even if privatization is more efficient than public action, including 
private entities in environmental enforcement may not be socially bene-
ficial. A common critique of private policing is that private activities can 
distort incentives for regulated entities in ways that are not consistent 
with the EPA’s regulatory goals.12 To the extent that these regulatory 
                                                                                                                      
 
determine the “root causes” of noncompliance. Id. at 5. The analysis found that many of 
the violations were unintentional, and the most frequently identified root cause of non-
compliance was that the facility was unaware of the applicability of a regulation. See id. at 
10, 14, 18, 20. Traditional deterrence-based enforcement methods such as random inspec-
tions are not necessarily effective at increasing compliance. Id. at 34. The analysis identi-
fied other potential methods to improve compliance, including those that involved private 
actors, such as of self-audits or third party audits. Id. 
6 See Eisner, supra note 1, at 141 (describing how private entities develop “an expan-
sive sense of corporate accountability for the impacts of their products and services accross 
the lifecycle”). 
7 See Nicholas A. Ashford & Charles C. Caldart, Environmental Law, Policy, 
and Economics: Reclaiming the Environmental Agenda 42 (2008) (noting that tradi-
tional environmental laws are media-based). 
8 See John D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means 
57 (1989) (noting that few people would be interested in privatization if it were not more 
efficient). 
9 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2029, 
2079–80 (2005). 
10 See Eisner, supra note 1, at 133–34. 
11 See Eisner, supra note 1, at 265 (noting that corporations have the best information 
regarding their production processes and technologies). 
12Compare Eisner, supra note 1, at 150 (describing how private policing is driven by con-
sumer demand and maximization of shareholder wealth, which limit the extent of voluntary 
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goals are consistent with public interests, any deviation would decrease 
public welfare overall.13 Thus, the benefits from any private policing 
initiatives need to be weighed against the negative consequences of each 
initiative to determine whether it is actually in the public interest. 
 This Article provides an overview of the types of private sector envi-
ronmental enforcement activities and initiatives that are currently taking 
place, which can be divided into three groups. The first group encom-
passes traditional public activities that have been formally outsourced to 
private entities.14 The second group covers private initiatives that are 
actively facilitated by the EPA but do not have an official mandate.15 The 
last group includes private initiatives that are largely independent of the 
EPA.16 For each group, this Article presents examples of specific pro-
grams or activities and highlights both the benefits and costs of these 
activities as well as the results of any empirical analyses that have been 
conducted.17 The Article then discusses more generally the overall ef-
fect of private participation on implementation and enforcement of en-
vironmental regulations within each group. It concludes by making a 
case for a more deliberate approach to evaluating the role of the private 
sector in the enforcement of environmental regulation.18 
                                                                                                                     
I. Formal Outsourcing from the EPA to Private Entities 
 Enforcement of environmental regulation has been formally out-
sourced to private entities in two primary ways. First, Congress formally 
outsourced enforcement powers to private citizens by providing a pri-
vate right of action in nearly all major environmental laws.19 Second, 
 
regulation), with National Enforcement Initiatives for Fiscal Years 2008–2010, Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/planning/priorities/ (last updated Jan. 20, 
2011) (“EPA sets national enforcement initiatives every three years to focus resources toward 
the most significant environmental problems and human health challenges identified by EPA 
staff, states, tribes, and the public.”). 
13 If regulation is misguided or if regulatory officials have been captured by special in-
terests, it might be possible for a deviation from regulatory goals to actually increase over-
all welfare. Throughout this Article, however, it is assumed that regulations are in the pub-
lic interest. 
14 See discussion infra notes 19–67. 
15 See discussion infra notes 68–109. 
16 See discussion infra notes 110–143. 
17 The examples chosen to illustrate each groups’ characteristics are admittedly subjec-
tive and were intended to illustrate the variety of roles that the private sector is currently 
playing in environmental regulation. They were not intended to be fully representative of 
all of the activities being conducted. 
18 See discussion infra notes 144–157. 
19 See, e.g., Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 
U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). 
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the EPA has formally outsourced some of its enforcement responsibili-
ties to regulated entities through its self-policing policy.20 
A. Citizen Suits 
 Environmental groups have used private suits to affect environ-
mental policy since the 1960s.21 In the 1970s Congress formally pro-
vided a private right of action in both the Clean Water Act (CWA) and 
the Clean Air Act (CAA).22 Since then, nearly all major environmental 
laws have also included provisions for citizen suits.23 Congress’s stated 
purpose for providing a private right of action was to complement pub-
lic enforcement.24 Citizen suits were not intended to be an alternative to 
public enforcement, but rather a means to leverage public enforcement 
and to fill subsequent gaps.25 Generally, the statutes allow individuals to 
file private suits if the EPA or state regulators are not ‘‘diligently prose-
cuting’’ the violator.26 Successful suits may result in the issuance of con-
sent decrees, fines paid into the U.S. Treasury, and reimbursement of 
the plaintiff’s litigation expenses based on market rates.27 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of 
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Audit Policy]; Incentives for 
Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 
66,706–712 (Dec. 22, 1995). 
21 See Jonathan Adler, Environmentalism at the Crossroads: Green Activism in 
America 42–44 (1995). 
22 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
23 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2006); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006); Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 
(2006); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 
(a)(1)(2006). 
24 See Comm. on Public Works, U.S. Senate, A Legislative History of the Clean 
Air Amendments of 1970, at 214 (1974) (prepared by the Congressional Research Ser-
vice) (“Such suits can contribute to the effective enforcement of air pollution control 
measures.”). 
25 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 
(1987), superseded by statute, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 
Stat. 2399, as recognized in Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Serv. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. 
Tex. 1995). The Court in Gwaltney explained that “the citizen suit is meant to supplement 
rather than to supplant governmental action.” Id. 
26 See e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B). The RCRA citizen-suit provision provision 
prohibits suits where “the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
ing a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance 
with such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order.” Id. 
27 Christian Langpap & Jay P. Shimshack, Private Citizen Suits and Public Enforcement: 
Substitutes or Complements?, 59 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 235, 237 (2010). 
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 One of the most obvious benefits of citizen suits from a regulatory 
perspective is that they can supplement public enforcement efforts 
when federal and state enforcement resources are limited, thereby in-
creasing the level of deterrence associated with environmental viola-
tions.28 A successful citizen suit can draw attention to a local area, type 
of violation, or even a particular regulated entity that is not being ade-
quately addressed, thereby filling gaps in the public enforcement proc-
ess.29 Of course, this additional enforcement comes at a cost to the pri-
vate entities that bring such suits (although successful plaintiffs may 
recover litigation costs from the defendants).30 A citizen suit may be 
more cost effective than public enforcement if the private party has ac-
cess to better information about particular environmental problems, or 
can more cheaply monitor potential polluters than federal or state reg-
ulators.31 Citizen suits may also help to overcome potential “agency cap-
ture” problems—where regulated entitities pressure government offi-
cials to under-enforce regulations at particular facilities.32 
 A potential downside of private suits is that they are not necessarily 
brought to advance the public interest, presumably unlike public en-
forcement actions.33 Critics claim that private suits generally advance 
the interests of one particular group, which may not be in line with 
public interests.34 Additionally, some detractors assert that private suits 
are often brought for the plaintiff’s economic gain or increased public-
ity, rather than to achieve an increase in environmental performance.35 
                                                                                                                      
 
28 See Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Pro-
tection, 12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 39, 49 (2001). In 2009, regulators conducted com-
pliance inspections at less than two percent of the one million entities subject to environ-
mental regulations. Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results 2009 Fiscal Year: Numbers at a 
Glance, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endof 
year/eoy2009/2009numbers.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter 2009 Numbers]; 
Facilities Registration System (FRS), Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/ 
facility.html#scope (last updated Dec. 7, 2009) [hereinafter FRS]. Data on regulated facili-
ties were compiled by the author using the EPA’s Envirofacts Database. Envirofacts, Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/enviro/ (last updated Nov. 8, 2011). 
29 See Adler, supra note 28, at 44–45. 
30 Id. at 45. 
31 See id. at 44, 49. 
32 See id. at 44, 48. 
33 See id. at 58–59. 
34 See id. at 58 (“[T]he priorities of environmental litigation outfits and individual citi-
zen-suit plaintiffs will not always align with the public’s interest in greater environmental 
protection.”). 
35 See Langpap & Shimshack, supra note 27; Kristi M. Smith, Who’s Suing Whom?: A 
Comparison of Government and Citizen Suit Environmental Enforcement Actions Brought Under 
EPA-Administered Statutes, 1995–2000, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 359, 373 (2004). Private 
groups may profit from successful suits because they can recover litigation costs based on 
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 Overall, citizen suits play a relatively minor role in environmental 
enforcement. In 2009, the EPA issued around 3500 administrative 
compliance and penalty orders, referred 280 civil judicial actions, and 
brought just under 400 criminal cases.36 In comparison, on average 
nearly 50 private suits are filed annually.37 Most of the private suits over 
the last twenty years have been brought by local environmental groups 
or local chapters of larger organizations, such as Baykeepers or River-
keepers.38 
 While much has been written about the role of private suits in en-
vironmental enforcement, and several papers have presented data on 
the number and type of suits,39 there has been relatively little empirical 
analysis of the overall effect of private suits on enforcement. One ex-
ception is a recent paper by two economists, Christian Langpap and Jay 
Shimshack.40 This paper presents an econometric analysis of the effect 
that private suits against municipal wastewater treatment facilities have 
on regulatory inspections and enforcement.41 The analysis shows that, 
unlike Congress intended, private suits tend to act as a substitute for 
public enforcement rather than a complement.42 If citizen suits were a 
                                                                                                                      
 
market rates, not the actual litigation costs incurred by the group. See Adler, supra note 28, 
at 50; Smith, supra, at 377 n.88. 
36 EPA, 2009 Numbers, supra note 28. 
37 See Smith, supra note 35, at 385 (citing 287 suits over a period of six years, or just 
under fifty per year). This estimate is generally consistent with an Environmental Law In-
stitute study cited by Smith. Id. at 368 n. 41 (347 suits over a period of roughly six and a 
half years, just over fifty per year). 
38 Langpap & Shimshack, supra note 27, at 237; Adler, supra note 28, at 51. 
39 See, e.g., Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Prelimi-
nary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Law, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 833, 847–48 
(1985); James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits, 10 Widen-
er L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (2003). 
40 Langpap & Shimshack, supra note 27, at 235–36. 
41 Id. at 239. The study uses data to analyze the effect of such suits on federal and state 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) inspections and enforcement 
actions at “all ‘major’ municipal wastewater treatment facilities.” Id. at 236–39. Because the 
majority of private suits filed against wastewater treatment facilities are for water violations, 
the study focuses on NPDES inspection and enforcement activities. Id. at 236–37. The citi-
zen suit data is used to estimate a predicted probability of a citizen suit at each facility 
based on a number of explanatory variables including the facility’s characteristics and the 
location. Id. at 240–41, 247–48. The predicted probability of a suit is then used as an ex-
planatory variable in the inspection and enforcement action regressions. Id. at 243. To 
disentangle the causal impacts of private enforcement on public enforcement and control 
for potential endogeneity the authors used measures of judicial temperament and case-
loads as instrumental variables. Id. at 240. 
42 Id. at 235, 248. More specifically, the study found that private enforcement of mu-
nicipal wastewater treatment facilities complements public monitoring but substitutes for 
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complement to public enforcement, such suits would increase the like-
lihood of public enforcement by highlighting otherwise neglected ar-
eas.43 However, the study found that where there is a high likelihood of 
a private suit, regulators are less likely to bring a public enforcement 
action.44 This implies that citizen suits do not bring public attention to 
particular entities or areas, but rather take the place of public en-
forcement.45 This finding amplifies the potential concerns about pri-
vate suits. To the extent that private suits take the place of public en-
forcement in certain sectors or geographic areas, the ability for private 
objectives to supplant public objectives is magnified. 
B. The EPA’s Audit Policy 
 The second example of formal outsourcing is the EPA’s self-
policing policy, known informally as the Audit Policy, established in 
1995.46 The Audit Policy allows regulated entities to self-audit and then 
disclose any violations that they discover to regulators in exchange for 
significantly reduced penalties on those violations.47 To receive this 
benefit, the violations must be discovered as a result of a self-audit (not 
a government initiated or mandated inspection) and must be corrected 
or remediated in a timely manner.48 In addition, the EPA has stated 
that when entities self-police, formal EPA investigations and enforce-
ment actions may be unnecessary, which suggests that facilities may also 
experience lower levels of enforcement following a self-disclosure.49 
 Appropriately designed self-policing policies can be very benefi-
cial, as they can increase the number of violations that are remediated 
                                                                                                                      
public enforcement. Id. at 236. Overall, their findings suggest that “direct deterrence ef-
fects are significantly weakened by the net crowding out of public enforcement.” Id. 
43 See id. at 238, 248. 
44 Id. at 248–49. 
45 Id. 
46 See generally Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Pre-
vention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995). Minor revisions to the policy 
were issued in 2000. See Audit Policy, supra note 20. 
47 See Audit Policy, supra note 20. 
48 Id. There are a number of additional conditions the disclosure must meet to be eli-
gible for a penalty reduction. These conditions are discussed more fully in Sarah L. Staf-
ford, Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles to Guide Self-Policing Regimes, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 
2293, 2302–03 (2011) [hereinafter Stafford, Outsourcing]. 
49 See Auditing, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/incentives/ 
auditing/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
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as well as accelerate the timing of remediation.50 Moreover, enforce-
ment resources can be redirected from self-policers to other regulated 
entities, increasing overall deterrence with the same level of enforce-
ment resources.51 Poorly designed self-policing policies, however, can 
undermine deterrence by decreasing the cost of violating environ-
mental regulations, and thus decrease the overall level of compliance.52 
Additionally, some policies may allow facilities to strategically self-police 
in order to circumvent formal public enforcement.53 
 While the opportunity to self-police is available to most of the one 
million entities regulated by the EPA, only 1200 facilities (or less than 
one-tenth of a percent) self-disclosed in 2009.54 In comparison, of the 
approximately 20,000 facilities that were formally inspected by the EPA, 
more than 4000 (or twenty percent) had violations that warranted some 
form of enforcement.55 Of course, the EPA likely chooses to inspect 
those facilities that it believes are most likely to be in violation, thus such 
entities might be expected to have a higher percentage of violations 
than regulated entities in general.56 Additionally, the Audit Policy pro-
                                                                                                                      
50 Stafford, Outsourcing, supra note 48, at 2299–2300; Sarah L. Stafford, Self-Policing in a 
Targeted Enforcement Regime, 74 S. Econ. J. 934, 945 (2008) [hereinafter Stafford, Self-Policing 
Regime]. 
51 See Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 
16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 365, 411, 414 (1992). 
52 For a complete discussion of this problem, see Sarah L. Stafford, Does Self-Policing 
Help the Environment? EPA’s Audit Policy and Hazardous Waste Compliance, 6 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 1 
(2005) [hereinafter Stafford, Does Self-Policing Help?] (discussing the possibility that de-
creased future enforcement as a reward for self-disclosed violations may result in decreased 
investments in compliance). 
53 See Alexander Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Big Field, Small Potatoes: An Empirical 
Assessment of EPA’s Self-Audit Policy, 23 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 415, 426 (2004). If regu-
lators decrease enforcement efforts at regulated entities that self-police, entities could use 
self-disclosures as “red herrings,” notifying regulators of small violations while concealing 
more significant violations. See id. Additionally, if regulators decrease future enforcement 
as a reward for a self-disclosed violation, entities may also decrease investments in compli-
ance in the future. See Stafford, Self-Policing Regime, supra note 50, at 945. 
54 See FRS, supra note 28 (calculating number of regulated entities); EPA, 2009 Num-
bers, supra note 28 (indicating number of self disclosures). 
55 See EPA, 2009 Numbers, supra note 28. 
56 See Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO): Frequently Asked Questions, Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo/faq.html#how_is_compliance (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2012) (noting that the EPA considers citizen tips and violation histories when se-
lecting a facility to inspect). In addition to citizen tips and a facility’s violation history, the 
EPA also considers facility size, potential for environmental harm, geographic initiatives, 
statutory requirements, protection of sensitive ecosystems, demographics, and industry 
type. Id. 
82 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39:73 
vides that a particular violation can only be disclosed once,57 so the total 
number of disclosures over the life of the Audit Policy might provide a 
more meaningful estimate of its relative importance. Since 1999, the 
EPA has received more than 15,000 voluntary disclosures.58 
 Although opponents of the Audit Policy initially argued that it 
would have a detrimental effect on the environment by protecting pol-
luters from punishment and decreasing the incentives for entities to 
comply with regulations, empirical analyses of the policy have not 
found any such effects.59 On the contrary, the studies suggest that the 
Audit Policy has had a positive impact on both compliance and envi-
ronmental performance.60 My own study of its effect on compliance 
with hazardous waste regulations found no evidence that overall com-
pliance decreased as a result of the Audit Policy.61 Moreover, I found 
that state self-policing policies modeled on the federal Audit Policy de-
creased the probability of a violation.62 Michael Toffel and Jodi Short 
examined the effect of the Audit Policy on firm compliance with CAA 
regulations, rather than hazardous waste regulations, and found that 
self-disclosers had lower levels of abnormal releases and higher compli-
ance rates in the five years following their disclosure.63 Taken together, 
these studies indicate that the EPA’s Audit Policy increases compliance 
                                                                                                                      
57 See Audit Policy, supra note 20, at 19,622–23; EPA’s Audit Policy, Envtl. Prot. Agen-
cy, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/incentives/auditing/auditpolicy.html (last visited Dec. 
28, 2011). 
58 See EPA, National Enforcement Trends (NETs) Report, at H-3 (2011) available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/reports/nets.html. 
59 See Stafford, Does Self-Policing Help?, supra note 52, at 3. 
60 See id. at 3, 22; Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does 
Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing? (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper, No. 
08-098, 2010) 4, 5 available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/workingpapers/papers 
0708.html#wp08-098. 
61 See Stafford, Does Self-Policing Help?, supra note 52, at 22. The analysis used data on 
detected hazardous waste violations and EPA enforcement actions to statistically determine 
if there has been an underlying change in the compliance behavior of regulated entities. 
See id. at 9, 21, 22. The results show that the federal Audit Policy had no measurable effect 
on compliance behavior. See id. at 21, 22. 
62 See id. at 22. A number of states have passed their own self-policing policies, as well 
as immunity and privilege legislation for environmental audits. Sarah L. Stafford, State 
Adoption of Environmental Audit Initiatives, 24 Contemp. Econ. Pol’y. 172, 172 (2006) 
[hereinafter Stafford, State Adoption]. State audit privilege legislation decreases the prob-
ability of a violation, while state legislation that provides complete penalty immunity for 
self-disclosed violations increases the probability of a violation. Stafford, Does Self-Policing 
Help?, supra note 52, at 21. 
63 Toffel & Short, supra note 60, at 17, 29, 32. The analysis uses data on self-disclosures, 
self-reported abnormal releases of toxic chemicals to the environment, and compliance sta-
tus to conduct an econometric analysis of the effect of self-disclosures on the number of ab-
normal releases and compliance status in the years following a disclosure. See id. at 17–21. 
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and performance, or at a minimum, does not decrease it.64 Given that 
overall environmental enforcement resources decreased over the time 
frame of these analyses,65 there is reasonable evidence that the effi-
ciency of the EPA’s enforcement program has increased in the short 
run under the Audit Policy. 
 However, these two studies of the Audit Policy have found that self-
policers benefit from a lower probability of enforcement following a 
disclosure.66 This finding suggests that some entities may strategically 
self-police in order to reduce future enforcement.67 If entities exploit 
these “enforcement holidays” by taking steps to reduce future compli-
ance, long-term compliance may not necessarily increase under the 
Audit Policy. 
II. Private Initiatives Actively Facilitated by the EPA 
 In addition to formally outsourcing some activities to private enti-
ties, the EPA actively facilitates a number of private initiatives that help 
it to implement and enforce environmental regulations. This category 
includes what is arguably the most influential role that private parties 
play in environmental regulation—consumers and investors can punish 
or reward companies for their environmental performance.68 
A. Information Programs to Facilitate Enforcement by the Market 
 In principle, consumers that care about the environment should 
favor products and manufacturers that are environmentally protective.69 
Similarly, investors who care about the environment may also make in-
vestment decisions based on environmental performance.70 More gen-
                                                                                                                      
 
64 See Stafford, Does Self-Policing Help?, supra note 52, at 22; Toffel & Short, supra note 
60, at 32. 
65 See Gray & Shimshack, supra note 3, at 7 fig. 1. 
66 See Toffel & Short, supra note 60, at 29; Sarah L. Stafford, Should You Turn Yourself In? 
The Consequences of Environmental Self-Policing, 26 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 305, 318 
(2007). 
67 See Toffel & Short, supra note 60, at 29; Stafford, State Adoption, supra note 62, at 172. 
68 See David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation, 
31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,773, 10,776 n.38, 10,778 (2001); P.N. Grabosky, Green Markets: Envi-
ronmental Regulation by the Private Sector, 16 L. & Pol’y 419, 427, 428 (1994). 
69 See Case, supra note 68, at 10,776. Many authors have written extensively about the 
ability of consumers and investors to exert significant influence on environmental per-
formance. See, e.g., Grabosky, supra note 68, at 429. 
70 See Case, supra note 68, at 10,780; Grabosky, supra note 68, at 435. According to the 
Social Investment Forum—a trade association for professionals, firms, institutions, and 
organizations engaged in socially responsible and sustainable investing—socially responsi-
ble investing currently encompasses an estimated $3 trillion in the U.S. investment market 
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erally, all investors should care about the potential liability associated 
with poor environmental performance and, in industries where custom-
ers care about the environment, investors may push for an increase in 
environmental performance to gain a competitive advantage.71 
 The term “social market” has been used to describe markets where 
consumption and investment decisions depend not only on prefer-
ences regarding price, quality, and product features, but also on envi-
ronmental or other social consequences of production.72 For social 
markets to function well, consumers and investors must have relevant 
information on all of the companies in the market.73 More specifically, 
for consumers and investors to be able to effect changes in corporate 
environmental practices by punishing and rewarding companies for 
their environmental performance, they must first have relevant infor-
mation.74 
 The EPA has developed a number of information programs de-
signed to provide consumers and investors with relevant information 
about the environmental performance of regulated facilities.75 Argua-
bly, the most socially significant disclosure program is the Toxics Re-
lease Inventory (TRI) database.76 The TRI provides information on the 
environmental impact of various companies by requiring regulated en-
tities to disclose the type and level of toxic chemicals used and released 
into environmental media—air, water, and land.77 Programs like the 
TRI require additional reporting by regulated entities, thus increasing 
                                                                                                                      
(out of a total of $25 trillion). See Soc. Inv. Forum Found., Report on Socially Respon-
sible Investing Trends in the United States 8 (2010), available at http://ussif.org/ 
resources/research/documents/2010TrendsES.pdf. 
71 See Case, supra note 68, at 10,777; Grabosky, supra note 68, at 427, 434, 436. 
72 Archon Fung, Making Social Markets: Dispersed Governance and Corporate Accountability, 
in Market-Based Governance: Supply Side, Demand Side, Upside, and Downside 145, 
146 ( John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye Jr. eds., 2002). 
73 See id. at 147. I focus on consumers and investors, although obviously other parties 
such as landlords, lenders, and potential buyers of firms can also take advantage of these 
information programs. See Vandenbergh, supra note 9, at 2045–58. 
74 See Fung, supra note 72, at 147–48. 
75 See Envirofacts—About the Data, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/enviro/ 
facts/qmr.html (last updated Dec. 15, 2011). 
76 See Case, supra note 68, at 10,775. 
77 TRI Data and Tools, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/index. 
html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). The TRI is considered a form of “informational regulation” 
as specific entities are required to disclose information on their operations and performance. 
See Case, supra note 68, at 10,774–75 (explaining the concept of information regulation); see 
also 40 C.F.R. § 372.25–.28 (2008) (providing minimum thresholds for activation of reporting 
requirements); Toxics Release Inventory, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/tri/in- 
dex.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2012) (providing a full description of the TRI program and 
database). 
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their costs, although those entities are still the low-cost providers of 
such information.78 Another information source that the EPA has de-
veloped is the Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) 
database which provides information on the compliance history of reg-
ulated entities.79 Since the ECHO database is essentially an interface 
for data already collected and maintained by the EPA for other pur-
poses,80 the only additional costs of this program are those associated 
with developing and maintaining the ECHO system. Both the TRI and 
ECHO databases are easily accessible for direct use by consumers, in-
vestors, and third parties such as news organizations, non-profits like 
the Environmental Defense Fund, and investment groups such as the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center.81 
                                                                                                                     
 Harnessing the power of the market to provide additional pressure 
on regulated entities to improve their environmental compliance has 
the potential to be very cost-effective.82 In addition, consumers and in-
vestors can gain personally because they are able to make investment 
and consumption decisions more in line with their personal preferences 
without having to spend significant additional resources.83 However, the 
literature identifies a number of potential concerns that can arise in so-
cial markets.84 One principal critique is that consumers and investors act 
for their own, rather than the general public’s, interest.85 For example, 
consumers might be more concerned with releases of pollution into air 
than water, even though water pollution may be more harmful to the 
 
78 Case, supra note 68, at 10,781 & n.108. It would be much more expensive for con-
sumers and investors to obtain such information independently. See id. 
79 Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO), Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www. 
epa-echo.gov/echo/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). ECHO does not require regulated entities 
to disclose additional information, but rather is a tool developed by the EPA to make its 
information more accessible to the public. Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See, e.g., Pollution in Your Community, Scorecard, http://www.scorecard.org (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2012). The Environmental Defense Fund developed a “Scorecard” to rate compa-
nies’ environmental performances using TRI data. Environmental Defense Funds Scorecard; An 
Interactive and Educational Site About Pollution, NASA, http://gcmd.nasa.gov/records/Score 
card-00.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). This scorecard has since been transferred to an in-
dependent NGO, the Green Media Toolshed. See Pollution in Your Community, supra (follow 
“About Scorecard” hyperlink, then follow “The History of Scorecard” hyperlink). The Inves-
tor Responsibility Research Center used TRI data in compiling its corporate environmental 
profiles. Ashford & Caldart, supra note 7 at 79. 
82 See Fung, supra note 72, at 174–75. 
83 See id. at 149–50. 
84 See id. at 146, 163. 
85 See id. at 163–64. If agency priorities are not consistent with the public interest, so-
cial markets provide a direct way for the public to influence behavior. See Vandenbergh, 
supra note 9, at 2034. 
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environment than air pollution.86 Thus, private parties may alter the 
priorities of firms in a way that is not consistent with public priorities.87 
In theory, the EPA can respond to the shift in incentives by changing its 
own behavior to balance out that of private parties.88 To make such ad-
justments, the EPA would need to assess the impact of consumer and 
investor pressure on environmental behavior and then modify either 
the underlying regulations or the public enforcement strategy.89 
 A second concern about social markets is that only certain private 
parties can participate in them. Individuals must have sufficient re-
sources to be either investors or discriminating consumers with the 
ability to have an effect on the environmental behavior of entities in 
these markets.90 Moreover, regulated entities will not be uniformly af-
fected by these pressures.91 Reputation-sensitive firms, firms that pro-
duce final consumer goods, and publicly traded firms will be subject to 
more pressure than firms that produce intermediate goods or are pri-
vately held.92 In theory, these concerns could also be addressed by eval-
uating the effects of social markets on environmental performance and 
adjusting regulation or enforcement to balance those effects.93 
 Despite such concerns, a number of economic studies have shown 
that investors respond to the information provided by these programs.94 
There are also a number of studies that provide indirect evidence that 
some consumers respond to the environmental performance of firms.95 
To date, however, there are no reliable estimates of the number of con-
                                                                                                                      
86 See Mark A. Cohen, Information as a Policy Instrument in Protecting the Environment: 
What Have We Learned? 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,425, 10,428 (2001). The public may “be misin-
formed about the risks of various pollutants and media attention might have more to do 
with which firms reduce emissions than any social cost-benefit analysis.” Id. at 10,430–31. 
87 Id. at 10,428. 
88 See Fung, supra note 72, at 153–56 (discussing the ability of federal agencies to sup-
plement and clarify competing information claims by private parties). 
89 See id. at 156–57 (noting the benefits of influencing social market forces to achieve 
regulatory goals). 
90 See id. at 150. Additionally, future generations are unlikely to be fully represented by 
current investors and consumers. See Vandenbergh, supra note 9, at 2081–82. 
91 Fung, supra note 72, at 164–65. 
92 See id. This may be changing, however, as intermediate producers are increasingly 
held to certain standards by other producers. See Vandenbergh, supra note 9, at 2059–60 
(describing the effect of second-order agreements upon companies, their suppliers, and 
other corporate associations). 
93 See Fung, supra note 72, at 156–57 (noting the benefits of influencing social market 
forces to achieve regulatory goals). 
94 See Case, supra note 68, at 10,778; Sarah L. Stafford, Can Consumers Enforce Environ-
mental Regulations? The Role of the Market in Hazardous Waste Compliance, 31 J. Reg. Econ. 83, 
85 (2007) [hereinafter Stafford, Role of Market]. 
95 For an overview of this topic, see Stafford, Role of Market, supra note 94, at 84. 
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sumers and investors who make consumption and investment decisions 
based on environmental preferences, nor is there any reliable indication 
of what those preferences are and how they line up with regulatory 
goals. Additionally there is only indirect evidence that regulated entities’ 
environmental decisions are affected by these social markets.96 Thus, 
there is very little understanding of exactly how social markets and the 
EPA’s information programs are affecting environmental performance 
overall. Moreover, there does not appear to be any process for adjusting 
regulatory objectives based on the presence of social markets. 
B. Compliance Assistance by Private Entities 
 The EPA has also facilitated the participation of private entities in 
providing compliance assistance to regulated entities.97 Compliance as-
sistance currently plays an important part in the EPA’s overall enforce-
ment and compliance assurance strategy.98 The general goal of compli-
ance assistance programs is to increase environmental performance by 
inducing more efficient implementation of regulatory requirements.99 
 In 1994, the EPA began offering formal compliance assistance after 
its enforcement functions were reorganized to create a single Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance.100 From the beginning, the 
EPA’s compliance assistance strategy included partnerships with indus-
try.101 The private role in compliance assistance increased significantly 
in 1999 when the EPA formally adopted a “wholesaler” approach— de-
                                                                                                                      
96 See Shakeb Afsah et al., Regulation in the Information Age: Indonesian Public 
Information Program for Environmental Management 1, 9 (1997), available at http://site 
resources.worldbank.org/NIPRINT/Resources/RegulationInTheInformationAge.pdf (finding 
that the creation of a public disclosure program in Indonesia caused firms in the program to 
improve their environmental performance); Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information 
as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right-to-Know Law on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. Envtl. Econ. 
& Mgmt. 109, 110 (1997) (finding that firms with the largest stock price decreases following 
the release of environmental information respond with the largest decreases in future pollu-
tion). 
97 See EPA, 2006–2011 EPA Strategic Plan: Charting Our Course 128–29 (2006). 
98 See id. at 128 (“Effective compliance assistance and strong, consistent enforcement 
are critical to achieving the human health and environmental benefits expected from our 
environmental laws.”). 
99 See Compliance Assistance, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ 
assistance/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
100 Press Release, EPA, EPA Administrator Details Design of Reorganized Enforcement 
Office (Oct. 13, 1993) (on file with author); Targeting & Eval. Branch, EPA, FY 1995 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Accomplishments Report 1-1, 5-1 (1996), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/accomplishments/oeca/ 
fy95accomplishment.pdf. 
101 Targeting & Eval. Branch, supra note 100. 
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veloping compliance assistance tools and materials and then involving 
states, localities and private providers (including NGOs, trade associa-
tions, and consultants) to deliver the assistance directly to the regulated 
community.102 
 This approach to compliance assistance separates activities for 
which the EPA is likely to be the least-cost provider from those where 
private entities may be able to provide such services at a lower price.103 
Thus, given the EPA’s intimate knowledge of the regulations and the 
manner in which compliance with those regulations is monitored and 
enforced, the Agency continues to develop guidance and compliance 
assistance tools.104 The EPA then provides these tools as well as compli-
ance assistance training to private providers, who in turn provide the 
actual compliance assistance to facilities.105 In addition to the presump-
tion that private providers may be able to offer the actual compliance 
services at a lower cost than the government, some regulated entities 
are more willing to seek compliance assistance from independent par-
ties than from regulators.106 One potential downside to this outsourc-
ing is that private providers may emphasize different compliance objec-
tives. For example, private providers may focus on helping regulated 
                                                                                                                      
102 See EPA, Innovative Approaches to Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 
4, 7 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov (follow “Publications, Newsletters” hyperlink; 
then follow “National Service Center for Environmetal Publications” hyperlink; then 
search “Innovative Approaches to Enforcement and Complaince Assurance”; then follow 
“Search” hyperlink). 
103 See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text (discussing how the EPA compiles the 
ECHO and TRI databases, but shifts reporting costs to private entities that are the least-
cost providers of information). 
104 See Compliance Assistance, supra note 99. 
105 See generally, EPA, Guide for Addressing Environmental Problems: Using an In-
tegrated Strategic Approach (2007) (providing strategic approaches for improved com-
pliance and to assist practitioners in future strategic planning). The EPA also continues to 
provide some compliance assistance directly to regulated entities through its regional offices, 
as do many state environmental agencies. See EPA Regional Compliance Assistance Coordinator, 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/contact/cac_regional.html (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
106 If private providers can provide compliance assistance at a lower “social” cost (i.e. a 
lower total cost to society overall) than the government, that does not necessarily imply that 
regulated entities that seek such assistance will pay less than if they obtain the assistance from 
public sources. Thus, moving to the wholesale model of compliance assistance could be more 
efficient, but could also shift costs from the regulatory agency to regulated entities. See Com-
pliance Assistance, supra note 99. However, some private providers are non-profit entities or 
states, many of which continue to provide compliance assistance for small businesses or con-
tract with third parties (such as universities) to provide compliance assistance for free or at a 
reduced cost. See, e.g., Pollution Prevention Inst. & Small Bus. Envtl. Assistance Program, Kansas 
State Univ., http://www.sbeap.org/index.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
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entities pass compliance inspections rather than achieving full compli-
ance with the regulations. 
                                                                                                                     
 There is no formal estimate of the number of private compliance 
assistance providers. However, one can get a sense of the potential 
number by examining EPA data on compliance assistance “contacts.” In 
2007 the EPA had more than 50,000 contacts with compliance assis-
tance providers (not including contacts with compliance assistance per-
sonnel employed directly by regulated entities).107 While individual 
providers could have had multiple contacts (e.g., participation in mul-
tiple online training programs) this figure suggests that the number of 
private entities actively involved in helping regulated entities imple-
ment environmental compliance programs is not insignificant.108 To 
date, however, there has been no formal assessment on the effect of the 
EPA’s “wholesaler” approach to overall compliance assistance, nor has 
there been any formal evaluation of the effectiveness of the EPA’s over-
all compliance-assistance program.109 
III. Informal Privatization Independent of the EPA 
 The final category of private activities are those that have been ini-
tiated by private entities and are largely independent of the EPA.110 
There are many such initiatives, although most are specific to a particu-
lar industry or geographic area and are not well known or publi-
cized.111 Others are larger in scale and have received a reasonable 
amount of attention.112 This paper presents two relatively well-known 
 
107 EPA, Integrated Compliance Information System: Compliance Assistance 
Monthly Managers Report (Sept., 19, 2009) (report provided by Karen Koslow, Acting 
Director of the Compliance Assistance & Sector Program Division of OECA, on file with 
author). 
108 See id.; Shelley Metzenbaum, Compliance and Deterrence Research Project: Measuring Com-
pliance Assistance Outcomes, State of Science and Practice White Paper 1, 18, 29, 35 (2007) available 
at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/compliance/research/ (search for 
paper under “Compliance Assistance Outcome Measurment” subheading). 
109 See Metzenbaum, supra note 108, at 6, 16, 60–61. The EPA tracks the number of en-
tities “reached” through its compliance assistance programs and compiles feedback from 
entities receiving assistance as to whether that assistance is useful, but there has been no 
larger assessment of the compliance assistance program. See id. at 6, 16. 
110 See Vandenbergh, supra note 9, at 2038 n.36. Vandenbergh identifies private second-
order regulatory agreements as “private in that the parties to the agreements are nongov-
ernmental entities. They are second-order in that they are entered into in response to the 
existence or absence of first-order government regulatory requirements.” Id. at 2030–31. 
111 See, e.g., id. at 2064–65 (discussing “good neighbor agreements,” which fall into this 
category). 
112 See, e.g., Eisner, supra note 1, at 163 (recognizing well known schemes such as the 
ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 series). 
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examples, the international ISO 14001 certification program and the 
U.S. Responsible Care program. 
A. ISO 14001 
 Probably the best known and farthest-reaching private initiative 
that affects environmental performance is the ISO 14001 certification 
program.113 ISO 14001 is a set of voluntary environmental manage-
ment standards established by the International Organization for Stan-
dards, an international non-governmental organization.114 The ISO 
14001 certification program essentially works as a labeling system, con-
veying information to potential investors and consumers about the en-
vironmental standards to which certified companies adhere.115 
                                                                                                                     
 While the information provided by ISO 14001 certification may be 
used similarly to the information provided by the EPA’s TRI and ECHO 
databases,116 there are several key differences between them. First, ISO 
14001 certification is voluntary117 whereas the EPA provides TRI data 
for all firms within a specified set industries (generally manufacturing), 
and ECHO information for all regulated entities.118 Second, the ISO 
14001 standards were developed primarily by companies, although 
there was some input from government agencies and advocacy groups 
from a number of countries.119 Finally, the ISO 14001 standards are 
unlike most U.S. environmental regulations, they do not specify maxi-
mum pollution levels or dictate particular equipment that must be in-
stalled, but instead enumerate environmental management standards 
to which firms must adhere to earn certification.120 The standards in-
clude compliance with all local environmental regulations as well as 
 
113 See id. at 167, 173. 
114 See id. at 163, 165–67, 173. 
115 See id. at 163, 167. 
116 See id. at 15, 163; Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO), supra note 79. 
117 Eisner, supra note 1, at 173. 
118 See 40 C.F.R. § 372.22–.28 (2008) (establishing TRI reporting requirements based on 
industry classification, number of employees, and type and amount of chemicals used and 
released); About the Site, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo/about_ 
site.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012) (stating that ECHO includes all regulated entities subject 
to the following environmental statutes: the CAA Stationary Source Program, the CWA Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act). 
119 EISNER, supra note 1, at 164. 
120 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006) (requiring EPA administrator to establish ambient 
air quality standards), with Eisner, supra note 1, at 165–67 (requiring organizations to 
adopt a policy suitable to the environmental impact of their services, products, or activi-
ties). 
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continuous improvement in environmental management. Thus, the 
standards require firms to focus on their overall environmental impacts 
and to think system-wide about how to improve their environmental 
performance—something that U.S. media-based regulatory programs 
do not do.121 The program also requires a third party to certify that the 
entity meets all the standards.122 Because ISO 14001 standards are not 
tied to any particular regulatory goals other than compliance with rele-
vant regulations, certified firms may choose to focus on areas for im-
provement that are different from the areas on which the EPA would 
like them to focus.123 
                                                                                                                     
 The EPA has never formally supported the IS0 14001 program.124 
Although the EPA supports the use of environmental management 
programs, it has not integrated the idea of environmental management 
systems directly into regulations or provided any incentives for regu-
lated entities to become certified.125 Perhaps as a result, ISO 14001 has 
not been as widely adopted in the United States as in other developed 
countries.126 In 2004, around 4800 U.S. firms had been certified, repre-
senting roughly five percent of total certifications worldwide and a very 
small percentage of the more than one million regulated entities in the 
United States.127 However, studies have shown that ISO 14001 certifica-
tion does improve a firm’s compliance with environmental regulations 
as well as its environmental performance generally.128 For example, two 
studies by Matthew Potoski and Aseem Prakash found that ISO 14001 
certification has a positive effect on regulated entities’ environmental 
performance, even after controlling for self-selection into the ISO 
 
121 See Eisner, supra note 1, at 165–66. See generally CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (regarding 
water quality); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (regarding solid waste). 
122 Eisner, supra note 1, at 166–67. 
123 See id. at 164–65, 174. 
124 See Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems (EMSs), Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, http://www.peercenter.net/ewebeditpro/items/O73F7607.pdf (last visited Dec. 
28, 2011) [hereinafter, EPA, Position Statement]. 
125 See id. (confirming that this policy statement is still in force and stating that it is the 
“EPA’s intent to continue to promote the voluntary widespread use of EMSs”); FRS, supra 
note 28. 
126 Eisner, supra note 1, at 167. 
127 Id. 
128 See, e.g., Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Covenants with Weak Swords: ISO 14001 
and Facilities’ Environmental Performance, 24 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 745, 745 (2005) 
[hereinafter Potoski & Prakash, Weak Swords]; Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green 
Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms’ Regulatory Compliance, 49 Am. J. Pol. 
Sci. 235, 245 (2005) [hereinafter Potoski & Prakash, Green Clubs]. 
92 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39:73 
14001 program.129 The first study found that certified entities spend 
less time out of compliance with CAA regulations than non-certified 
entities.130 The second found that certified entities have larger reduc-
tions in emissions of toxic chemicals than non-certified firms.131 
B. Responsible Care 
 Perhaps the most well-known example of a U.S. industry-led initia-
tive is the Responsible Care Program, introduced by the Chemical 
Manufacturer’s Association in 1988 partly in response to the Bhopal 
disaster.132 Pursuant to the program, all members of the Chemical 
Manufacturer’s Association, renamed the American Chemistry Council 
(ACC) in 2000, must commit to operating under the Responsible Care 
principles.133 These principles are designed to promote “continual im-
provement in environmental, health, and safety performance” within 
chemical companies.134 Members are also asked to establish at least one 
concrete goal in these areas and “make performance improvements 
towards the realization of that goal.”135 Though the program is manda-
tory for all trade association members, prior to 2004 there was no re-
quirement that an outside party certify compliance with program re-
quirements.136 
                                                                                                                      
129 See Potoski & Prakash, Weak Swords, supra note 128, at 746, 756; Potoski & Prakash, 
Green Clubs, supra note 128, at 245. 
130 See Potoski & Prakash, Green Clubs, supra note 128, at 245. 
131 See Potoski & Prakash, Weak Swords, supra note 128, at 746. In any study of the effect of 
ISO 14001 certification, it is important to control for the fact that regulated entities voluntar-
ily decide whether to become certified. See id. at 756. If there are particular factors or firm 
characteristics that both influence joining ISO 14001 and affect environmental performance, 
any analysis that does not control for those factors might attribute a particular change in 
performance to ISO 14001 certification when it is in fact due to the underlying factor. See id. 
Both of the Potoski and Prakash studies control for the fact that firms voluntarily self-select 
ISO 14001 certification using a two-step treatment-effects model. See  id. at 756; Potoski & 
Prakash, Green Clubs, supra note 128, at 240. 
132 See Eisner, supra note 1, at 161. The international Responsible Care program deter-
mines the “fundamental features” of the program, but Responsible Care is implemented by 
national trade associations in various countries, and thus each countries’ program is differ-
ent. See generally Responsible Care, Int’l Council of Chem. Ass’n, http://www.icca-
chem.org/en/Home/Responsible-care/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
133 See Eisner, supra note 1, at 161; The Nat’l Envtl. Educ. & Training Found., The 
Emerging Role of Associations as Mentors 4 n.7 (2000), available at http://www.neefusa. 
org/pdf/associations.pdf. 
134 Eisner, supra note 1, at 161. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 161–62. 
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 The potential benefits of the Responsible Care program are simi-
lar to those of the ISO 14001 program; in theory, the standards require 
firms to think system wide about how they could improve their envi-
ronmental performance.137 However, the Responsible Care standards 
are not tied to any regulatory goals, and unlike ISO 14001 they do not 
mandate compliance with EPA regulations.138 Thus, the potential con-
cern that private standards programs may drive regulated entities’ in-
centives away from public regulatory objectives is more pronounced for 
Responsible Care than it is for ISO 14001.139 Any distortion in incen-
tives away from public regulatory goals could, in theory, be balanced by 
a change in public implementation or enforcement activities. To do so, 
however, would require a more detailed evaluation of the effect of the 
program on environmental performance than has been conducted. 
 Similar to its stance on ISO 14001, the EPA does not formally rec-
ognize the Responsible Care program in its regulations and has not pro-
vided any significant incentives for regulated entities to participate.140 
Over 220 chemical companies participate in Responsible Care.141 While 
there are over 1500 chemical companies in the United States, the largest 
are ACC members; therefore, although fewer than one-fifth of all chem-
ical companies participate, most of the chemical production in the U.S. 
comes from companies who are participants.142 A study of the effective-
ness of the Responsible Care program by Andrew King and Michael Le-
nox (in 2000, prior to the requirement for outside verification) found 
                                                                                                                      
137 See id. at 161, 165–66. 
138 See id. at 161–62, 165–66, 275. 
139 See id. at 161–62, 165–66, 174, 275. 
140 See Eisner, supra note 1, at 275. The EPA signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the ACC stating that for the purposes of its now defunct National Environmental Per-
formance Track program (an EPA-led environmental certification program), it would ac-
cept Responsible Care certification in lieu of additional third party certification that regu-
lated entities have an environmental management system in place. Memorandum of 
Understanding between EPA and ACC between Brian Mannix, Associate Administrator of 
Policy, Economics, and Innovation, U.S. EPA and Carol Henry, Vice President, Industry 
Performance Programs, ACC (March, 2007) (on file with author per FOIA request). 
141 Responsible Care Management System® & Certification, Am. Chem. Council, http:// 
www.americanchemistry.com/s_responsiblecare/doc.asp?CID=1298&DID=5086 (last vis-
ited Jan. 12, 2012). 
142 See Press Release, Am. Chem. Council, American Chemistry Council Grows; Diversi-
fies Membership (Sept. 14, 2011) available at 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/Media/ 
PressReleasesTranscripts/ACC-news-releases/American-Chemistry-Council-Grows-Diversifies- 
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that participants did not significantly change their level of toxic emis-
sions relative to other non-participating chemical companies.143 No 
studies of the Responsible Care program have been conducted since the 
ACC imposed the requirement for third-party certification. 
IV. Evaluating the Role of the Private Sector in the 
Enforcement of Environmental Regulations 
 To assess whether the expanded role of private parties in the en-
forcement of environmental regulations is beneficial from a public pol-
icy perspective, it must be determined if the increased involvement of 
the private sector has either decreased the overall costs of achieving a 
particular level of environmental performance, or has increased envi-
ronmental performance in a cost-effective manner. In theory, all of the 
private activities and initiatives described in this Article—as well as the 
many others not mentioned—have tremendous potential to increase 
the efficiency of environmental enforcement. There is also the very real 
possibility that the involvement of private parties will shift incentives for 
regulated entities in a way that is not consistent with regulatory objec-
tives. Assuming that regulatory objectives have been set to maximize 
overall welfare, such a shift would not be in the public interest. Given 
the potential for private participation to divert regulated entities’ per-
formance away from regulatory objectives, a proactive approach must 
be taken in evaluating the effect of private participation to ensure that 
it is helping to achieve regulatory goals more efficiently. 
 This Article briefly discusses the results of several studies of par-
ticular private initiatives.144 In some cases, the studies demonstrate that 
private participation is having a positive effect on environmental per-
formance; analyses of the EPA’s self-policing policy find that it has in-
creased overall compliance, though analyses of the ISO 14001 program 
show that certification is correlated with an increase in both compli-
ance and environmental performance more generally.145 Some studies, 
                                                                                                                      
143 See Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: 
The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 Acad. Mgmt. J. 698, 709 (2000). The 
analysis examined industry emissions before and after the program for both ACC mem-
bers and non-members and found no evidence that the program had a positive effect on 
its members relative to non-members. See id. at 704, 709. The study did not explicitly con-
trol for the decision to participation in Responsible Care, since it is a mandatory require-
ment of membership in the ACC (although ACC membership is itself voluntary). See id. at 
704–05. 
144 See supra notes 39–45, 59–67, 94–96, 128–131, 143 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 59–67, 128–131 and accompanying text. 
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such as the one evaluating the Responsible Care program, do not re-
port any statistically significant effect on environmental perform-
ance.146 Other studies, such as the one concerning private suits that 
found private enforcement supplements rather than complements pub-
lic enforcement, suggest a deleterious effect on the achievement of 
regulatory goals.147 Although the studies surveyed in this Article are 
not a representative sample, their mixed findings suggest the need for 
careful evaluation of each one of these initiatives. Unfortunately, there 
is no real understanding of the effect of many programs, either because 
no analysis has been conducted (as is the case with the privatization of 
compliance assistance) or because the existing studies only tell us part 
of the story (as is the case with the analyses of social markets, where 
there is evidence of use of the information provided by the EPA, but 
little information on how that use ultimately affects facility behavior).148 
 Additional empirical analyses of private initiatives would help pro-
vide a better understanding of the effect of these programs on the 
overall achievement of regulatory goals. However, additional individual 
studies of particular programs are unlikely to be sufficient. First, the 
types of studies that have been conducted do not address the most sig-
nificant issue—whether this expansion of the role of private entities in 
the enforcement of environmental regulations is helping to achieve 
regulatory goals more efficiently.149 The existing studies often provide 
evidence of improvement in compliance rates or levels of toxic emis-
sions, but they do not measure the extent to which regulatory goals are 
satisfied. This shortcoming is in part because the regulatory goals 
themselves have not been explicitly identified and in part because most 
studies look at intermediate measures such as compliance, not ultimate 
measures of environmental quality.150 Unfortunately, it is not an easy 
task to develop the types of ultimate measures that would provide the 
necessary information. For some time, the EPA has been working to 
develop a robust set of environmental indicators that will provide better 
information on the actual state of the environment and its evolution, 
and hopefully such data will be available in the near future.151 
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 Even with good data on environmental quality, the determination 
of whether private initiatives are more efficient than public implemen-
tation and enforcement requires some sense of the relative costs of pri-
vate and public approaches. In many situations, it is assumed that pri-
vate entities will be more cost-effective than the government. That is 
unlikely to be the case for all private initiatives, however, particularly 
since the costs of private initiatives could be less obvious than the costs 
of public efforts. Unfortunately, costs are almost never included in 
analyses of private (or, for the most part, public) initiatives. For exam-
ple, none of the studies described in this Article made any attempt to 
compare the cost of private activities to their public alternatives. 
 Since it is unlikely that all private initiatives help to achieve regula-
tory goals more efficiently than public efforts, there needs to be a for-
mal evaluation process to determine which programs are beneficial and 
which—in their current form—are not. There also needs to be some 
mechanism to modify or eliminate programs that fall into the latter 
category. Without such a feedback mechanism, additional studies are 
not going to make much of a difference.152 
 Finally, even if studies of particular programs measured their effect 
on environmental quality and included a comparative analysis of costs, 
they might still fail to provide a full picture of the overall effect of ex-
panded private participation because they do not illustrate the effect of 
these initiatives in the aggregate. First, many of these programs over-
lap.153 For example, U.S. chemical producers can choose both to be 
members of Responsible Care and to earn ISO 14001 certification; 
moreover, the ACC has developed a “Responsible Care Management 
System” that meets the requirements of both programs.154 Second, pri-
vate initiatives may reinforce each other.155 For example, regulated en-
tities that receive compliance assistance often undergo environmental 
audits—entities may choose to self-police any violations discovered in 
the course of that audit, particularly if they are fully informed about the 
Audit Policy as part of the compliance assistance. Alternatively, private 
initiatives may work against each other. For example, the potential for 
private citizens to pursue suits against regulated entities may discourage 
some entities from conducting a self-audit because the audit would 
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generate a paper trail that could be used against the entity in a private 
suit.156 Ultimately, any examination of a single private initiative in isola-
tion that does not account for the potential interactions between pro-
grams is likely to produce biased results.157 As difficult as it would be to 
design a larger study, we need to examine the aggregate effects of this 
expansion of private roles. 
Conclusion 
 Given all of the potential benefits that can come from private par-
ticipation in environmental enforcement, there are currently—and will 
continue be—calls to expand the role of the private sector.158 But as 
discussed in this Article, not all private sector initiatives will ultimately 
be beneficial to society. Thus, before continuing to look for additional 
ways to increase private participation in the implementation and en-
forcement of environmental regulations, time and effort must be spent 
to develop processes to assess the effect of existing private participa-
tion.159 After gaining a better understanding of the effect of various 
private initiatives on the achievement of regulatory goals, a determina-
tion must then be made of how to best modify existing private initia-
tives and, potentially, the underlying regulations and enforcement 
mechanisms. Only then should expansion of the role of the private sec-
tor in the enforcement of environmental regulations be consid
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